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New York: An Analysis of Current Changes in Party Support 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 This paper is an analysis of the recent changes in party support throughout the state of 
New York.  Based on research by James Gimpel and Jason Schuknecht in their 2004 book 
“Patchwork Nation,” the focus is on determining which specific factors have been contributing to 
the shifts in support for the two major parties in key regions of the state.  In particular, migration 
and immigration as well as demographic changes within New York’s electorate are considered.  
More importantly, economic changes within the state and the effects they have had on party 
support are examined as well.  My research is based both on widely accepted theories about 
political parties and some theories of my own that have been inspired by popular political 
theories.   
 The quantitative data that I collected and analyzed has led me to conclude that the most 
significant forces behind changes in party support in New York are increased concentrations of 
young voters, changes in the economy, and increased minority and immigrant populations within 
counties.  An increase in the young population within counties has led to more Republican 
voting.  In terms of the economy, counties that have suffered from economic decline show 
increased support for the GOP.  Conversely, counties that have experienced economic 
improvement tend to vote more Democratic.  Increased minority populations, specifically a 
growth in the Hispanic population, have resulted in drastic declines in Republican voting.   
Similarly, counties that received a significant amount of immigrants experienced increased 
support for the Democratic Party.  Migration was not substantially correlated with changes in 
party support, although it should be noted that counties that experienced an increase in voters 
from the Northeast became more Democratic, and counties that gained voters from the South 
became more Republican.  It should also be noted that these correlations were found only for 
presidential election results.  Gubernatorial election results, on the other hand, appear 
uncorrelated with changing demographics. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 New York has historically been a classic example of a state where political influence is 
determined by region.  Since the beginning of the 20th century, the two major political parties 
have dominated key regions within the state.  The Democrats have maintained power and 
influence within New York City and urban areas upstate, while the Republicans have found 
consistent support in rural regions of upstate New York and the suburbs just outside New York 
City.  The two parties’ regional dominance originated in the early 1900s when the Democrats 
established their control over New York City politics.  Out of fear that the Democrats would 
eventually take over the entire state, upstate residents became increasingly supportive of the 
Republican Party (Green, J.C., & Shea, 1997).  In turn, the Republican Party focused its efforts 
on mobilizing the electorate in rural upstate New York to contain the Democratic Party’s power.  
So in effect, New Yorkers began to identify themselves with one of the two major parties based 
on the region they lived in rather than according to ideological beliefs (Green, J.C., & Shea, 
1997).  This tendency still occurs today, and it has been the major cause of competition between 
the Republican and Democratic Parties.  In order to fully understand the regional differences in 
party support, it should be noted that: 
  “for the last seventy years, political regionalism in New York has had foundations rooted 
 in voters’ attitudes about the proper role of the government in the economic 
 sphere…since beliefs about government’s role in the economic sphere still divide urban 
 and rural voters, politics in New York has long had a regional basis, especially when the 
 gulf between candidates on these policy matters is wide” (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 
 341; Stonecash, 1989). 
 However, during the last couple of decades the partisan makeup of some regions of New 
York has undergone substantial changes.  Regions that were once dominated by Democrats are 
now showing significant support for the Republican Party, and areas once dominated by 
Republicans are growing markedly more Democratic.  In addition, upstate counties of New York 
have become more competitive during presidential elections over the past few decades.  The 
most recent examples of changes in party support are two important Congressional upsets that 
occurred within the last year.  First was Democrat Kathy Hochul’s victory in upstate Republican 
territory for the 26th Congressional Seat.  Soon after Republican Bob Turner won the 9th 
Congressional Seat in a heavily Democratic district of New York City that includes Queens and 
part of Brooklyn.  In order to understand the shifts in party support within New York I have 
relied on key theories that address partisanship development and change among social groups. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 There is a significant amount of research that focuses on understanding partisan identities 
within the United States.  Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) have found that people tend to 
identify with a particular party and remain loyal to that party throughout their lifetime.  Often 
times the environment that one is raised in can have an effect on an individual’s partisan identity.  
Most people will identify with the same party as their parents, members of the religion they 
affiliate with, neighbors, and other peers (Hout & Knoke, 1974; Tedin, 1974; Achen, 2002).  One 
of the most significant early influences on an individual’s partisan identity development is the 
political views of their parents.  Converse (1969) found that intergenerational transmission of 
partisanship from parent to child is a key component of partisanship development, along with 
gained experience in politics and voting.  Bill Bishop has also studied partisan identification and 
found that most people associate with the dominant party in the area in which they live because 
people want to be accepted among their neighbors (Bishop, 2009).  Furthermore, if people 
perceive themselves to be “partisan outcasts,” they will typically seek out residence in areas 
where they can find people who share the same views and values (Bishop, 2009; Gosling, 2008; 
Florida, 2008; McDonald, 2007).   
 In regards to the state of New York, it appears that these theories only partially explain 
the sudden changes in party support.  For instance, at the close of the 20th century, aging suburbs 
that were previously dominated by the GOP began showing support for the Democratic Party in 
large part because minorities were migrating from the City into these areas (Gimpel & 
Schuknecht, 2004).  Minority groups were not under as much pressure as earlier migrants to 
convert to Republican partisanship and thus maintained their Democratic views in their new 
areas of residence (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004).  The fact that there are distinct differences in 
partisanship between ethnic groups in certain suburbs runs counter to the notion that people will 
change their partisanship in order to fit in with their peers.  Furthermore, these findings also do 
not support the hypothesis that people will necessarily migrate to areas where the majority shares 
their political views (e.g. Bishop, 2009).  A more logical explanation is that migrants choose to 
move to a particular area because of common interests concerning quality of life rather than 
shared partisanship with the native residents (Baldassare, 1992; Frey, 1985; Frey & Kobrin, 
1982).  As a result, “Republicans and Democrats wind up living side by side in these politically 
diverse locales, and cannot be described as moving to different places according to their partisan 
biases” (Tam Cho, Gimpel & Hui, 2010). 
  There are also additional considerations that challenge some of these prominent theories.  
In particular, I hypothesized that the economic changes that New York has endured since the 
early 1990s has led to changes in party support, despite the widespread notion that such 
conditions are insignificant to partisan identification.  In particular, I considered key factors such 
as migration within New York and from out of state, immigration from abroad, increased young 
populations, changes in the minority population, and changes in median income within the past 
twenty years and the extent to which these dynamics may have caused shifts in party support.   
 
The Significance of Migration and Immigration for Changes in Party Support 
 
 Over the course of the past century, New York City has been one of the most sought after 
destinations for immigrants and American natives alike; the city has historically been known for 
its endless opportunities and rich diversity.  However, at the close of the twentieth century, New 
York was no longer an appealing destination for United States citizens.  In fact, even New 
Yorkers began to flee from the Empire State; between 1990 and 1995, a little over one million 
residents migrated to other regions of the country (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 331).  Aside 
from interstate migration, New York has seen some significant mobility changes within its 
borders as well.  It appears that over the last couple of decades, New York City residents have 
migrated to suburban areas of the state while upstate New Yorkers have begun to move south 
toward the City; suburbs just outside the city that were once predominantly Republican are 
becoming more Democratic as voters move from the city to the suburbs (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 
2004).   
 There are a number of possible explanations for the migration of voters throughout the 
state of New York.  For the purpose of this paper the focus will be on ideas proposed by James 
Gimpel and James Schuknecht in their work “Patchwork Nation.”  Gimpel and Schuknecht 
found that native residents of New York tend to be more Republican than immigrants and 
interstate migrants.  It appears that in upstate New York regions that have historically been 
Republican are becoming more Democratic, and it may be the result of the settlement of voters 
from Democratic states such as Massachusetts, Connecticut, and other New England states 
(Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 333).  In the suburbs outside of New York City, it seems that 
Republicans are gaining more support because the cost of living in these areas is significantly 
high, making it less appealing for lower-income migrants (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 333).  
Furthermore, interstate migrants may have moved to areas in New York where they share 
common views with their neighbors in terms of taxes, education, the economy, and public policy. 
(Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004; Bishop, 2009).   
 However, because New York has not been attracting as many out of state migrants in 
recent decades as in the past, the effects of interstate migration may be limited.  Thus, “far more 
attention should be paid to differences between the politics of immigrants and native New 
Yorkers because the foreign-born population will be driving electoral change for decades into the 
twenty-first century” (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 333).  Immigration has had a considerable 
influence on New York politics as foreign-born voters tend to demonstrate strong support for the 
Democratic Party both historically and in the present.  At the beginning of the 20th century, most 
immigrants that came to New York identified themselves with the Democratic Party because of 
its support for individualism.   
 Individualism is a political ideology that emphasizes the worth of the individual; in the 
United States it is the foundation of the “American Dream.”  The American Dream captivated 
immigrants because it is the “hope for a better quality of life and a higher standard of living... 
this belief is that anyone, regardless of their status can ‘pull up their boot straps’ and raise 
themselves from poverty” ("Making sense of," 2009).  Individualistic Democrats held “strong 
commercial attitude[s], both about life in general and about government.  These industrious 
people sought their fortunes through business and hard work, and they did not see any problem 
with the government helping a person achieve his or her own personal economic goals” 
(Donovan, Mooney, & Smith, 2010, 29-30).  Individualism still defines the political culture of 
New York today, and continues to appeal to immigrants who favor the Democratic Party.   
 Nationally, immigration has become increasingly important in politics as well.  
Immigrants are the “fastest-growing segment of the American electorate” (Fitz & Kelley, 2011) 
and New York in particular has seen a substantial increase in its immigrant population.  
According to the Census Bureau, between 2005 and 2009 a little less than a quarter of New 
York’s entire population was made up of foreign-born residents.  Nationally, immigrants have 
become much more influential as they become more politically involved.  Conservative anti-
immigration movements have allowed the Democrats to gain more support among foreign-born 
voters.  Throughout the country, immigrants have proven to be a significant force in elections: 
 “These voters have the power to swing elections. In Indiana, where immigrants accounted 
 for only 2 percent of the electorate, Sen. Barack Obama received 24,000 more of their 
 votes than Sen. John McCain, which gave Obama the 1 percent margin needed to win the 
 state. Likewise in Nevada, where polls prior to the 2010 election gave Senate Majority 
 Leader Harry Reid (D) little chance of winning re-election, Reid ended up winning 
 another term with 90 percent of the Latino vote and helped secure Democratic control of 
 the Senate” (Fitz & Kelley, 2011). 
Similar to national trends, the vast majority of immigrants within New York support the 
Democratic Party.  Therefore, I predict that increased immigrant populations in New York 
counties have led to more Democratic voting. 
 As it is clear that immigrants and interstate migrants have had an effect on party support 
within New York, it is important to consider the extent to which their political views have either 
challenged or conformed to those held by the majority in the region to which they move.  This 
leads to another important consideration for understanding the changes in party support within 
New York – The relevance of homogeneity within regions of New York. 
Economic Effects of “The Big Sort” on Party Support in New York: Income, Education, 
and Class 
 According to Bill Bishop, American voters will usually settle in areas where their values 
and interests are shared by the majority of residents.  In New York, the state has long been 
known for its regional differences in terms of politics.  It is important to note that people do not 
move to certain regions because of partisanship, but rather for economic reasons such as 
employment and cost of living.  However, this tendency can result in political consequences as 
certain areas begin to show a majority preference for a party because its residents tend to be of 
the same class and share common interests (Bishop, 2009; Clark & Ladwith, 2007; Tam Cho, 
Gimpel & Hui, 2010).  Seeing as certain regions in New York are beginning to stray away from 
previous party loyalties, it appears that changes in the population in certain areas are beginning 
to have an effect on regional politics.  Bishop mentions a number of factors that have led to the 
“sorting” of American voters into specific regions throughout the country, and these ideas are 
relevant to the current phenomenon taking place in New York.  Average income is a significant 
predictor of voter mobility, with poorer migrants moving to regions that are typically Republican 
landslides while higher-income migrants tend to move to areas dominated by the Democrats 
(Bishop, 2009).   
 This trend can be seen in New York as poor migrants are moving from the 
Democratically dominated boroughs of New York City to Republican territory in the nearby 
suburbs.  In turn, the better educated and higher-income young migrants are moving from 
Republican rural areas upstate to Democratic regions downstate.  Education is a significant force 
behind voter migration; Bishop found that areas with a high concentration of college-educated 
residents were among the richest and most developed regions in the country (Bishop, 2009).  
Educated people began to move from rural areas to more prosperous regions with the most 
opportunities.  In New York, the contrast between regions is most certainly a deciding factor for 
migrant voters.  Upstate New York has experienced a significant economic decline compared to 
other regions of the state due to changes in agricultural production.  As a result, the rural regions 
of upstate New York have experienced an exodus of young voters as they seek out areas that are 
much more stable economically.   
 This leads me to posit that economic stability has been a driving force behind the 
migration trends of New York residents.  Consequently, voter mobility due to changes in the 
economy may have had a significant impact on party support, despite the fact that some theories 
dismiss temporary political conditions as having little to no influence on partisan affiliation (e.g. 
Green, Palmquist & Shickler, 2002).  I expect that economic decline will result in more support 
for the Republican Party, and economic prosperity will lead to more Democratic voting.  Recent 
changes in the economy may be causing more support for the GOP amongst young voters, given 
the fact that economic policy and government spending are key issues that divide New York 
voters (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004).  This leads to another important consideration in 
population mobility, which is age and generational replacement. 
  
The Significance of Age and Generational Replacement in New York’s Changing 
Electorate 
 In regards to the notion that parents’ partisanship has a significant impact on their 
offspring’s partisan identity development, the intergenerational theory fails to explain the 
changes in party support within New York’s electorate.  In particular, parents’ partisan identities 
do not appear to have as strong of an influence on the partisan identities of their children as was 
previously thought.  Given the fact that younger voters are taking up different political stances 
compared to their older counterparts, it seems as though younger generations are abandoning the 
political views held by their parents and grandparents.  The variance in partisan identification 
between generations is due to the fact that “although teenagers are strongly influenced by their 
parents’ party affinities, this imprint fades over time as young adults are exposed to other 
influences and develop their own views.”  Furthermore, “partisans remain open to new 
information, and one reason that generations develop different party attachments is that they 
arrive at different impressions of which groups comprise and typify Democrats and Republicans” 
(Green, Palmquist & Schickler, 2002, 82; Converse, 1969). 
 According to Gimpel and Schuknecht (2004), the suburbs just outside of New York City 
experienced rapid generational replacement which resulted in a shift from traditional support for 
the Democratic Party to that of the GOP.  Younger voters’ partisan identities may be markedly 
different from those of older generations because they are assessing current economic issues that 
are relevant to their lives rather than relying on partisan cues from their parents and grandparents 
(Markus & Converse 1979; Fiorina 1981; Franklin & Jackson 1983).  For instance, when the 
manufacturing industry was stable in New York during the 1940s and 1950s, the majority of 
manufacturing workers supported the Democratic Party because of its appeal to lower-income 
citizens.  However, during the 1980s and 1990s, the manufacturing industry in New York 
drastically declined, resulting in decreased support for the Democratic Party amongst blue-collar 
workers who were facing new economic challenges that workers fifty years earlier had not 
experienced (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 338).  Thus, party support can change from one 
generation to the next as voters determine which party best addresses the political issues that are 
significant during their lifetime.    
 Gimpel and Schuknecht examine how generational replacement has had an effect on 
party support among voters in New York and throughout the country in general.  For instance, 
the New Deal realignment caused voters who had reached retirement age by the 1950s and 1960s 
to vote more Democratic, but as the generation was replaced with a new wave of young voters, 
voting trends shifted back in favor of the Republicans in the 1990s when the majority of the 
population showed support for the GOP (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004).  Today, it appears that 
younger populations in New York are becoming more Republican, while older voters are leaning 
more towards the Democrats.   
 Upstate regions of New York that have historically supported the Republican Party are 
leaning more towards the Democrats as younger voters are leaving the area, causing the 
remaining population to be mostly made up of the elderly and the poor.  It appears that younger 
voters are moving to the more prosperous suburbs downstate where there is more opportunity for 
jobs and financial stability.  It is important to note that “young people are more likely than old 
people to move.  And young, educated people are more likely to move farther and more often 
than are young, less educated people… the likelihood that a twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-old 
would live within three miles of a city center increased significantly in each of the fifty largest 
metro areas during the 1990s.  Older people, meanwhile, clustered in the country’s least dynamic 
(economically and technologically, at least) cities” (Bishop, 2009, 133).   
 In New York, the better educated and higher-income voters tend to support the 
Republican Party, unlike national trends where although higher-income voters tend to vote 
Republican, the better educated have shown to be more supportive of the Democratic Party.  So 
in New York it would follow that young, college-educated migrants are causing the suburbs 
close to New York City to become more Republican.  On the other hand, due to the economic 
decline of upstate New York, older voters who once supported the GOP are now more inclined 
to support the Democratic Party because of its positions on issues such as welfare and health care 
(Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004).  In fact, Democrat Kathy Hochul was able to win over the 
Republican district in upstate New York because her campaign was specifically focused on 
defending Medicare against proposed cuts by the GOP, making her more appealing to elderly 
voters (Sarlin, 2011). 
 Thus, age will be a significant consideration throughout the course of this paper, 
specifically in terms of how increased concentrations of either younger or older voters in a given 
area have affected changes in party support within that region.  In particular, I hypothesize that 
counties that experienced substantial increases in young voters are becoming more Republican.  
Aside from age, race and ethnicity are also important demographic considerations for changes in 
party support.  Thus, the final factor for analysis will be the extent to which minority populations 
have contributed to shifts in party support throughout New York. 
 
The Effects of Increased Minority Populations on Party Support 
 Since the 1960s, New York City has had high levels of intergroup conflict during local 
elections.  Furthermore, over the last few decades there has been a substantial increase in the 
African-American and Hispanic/Latino populations.  At the same time there has been a decrease 
in the overall white population within the City.  Gimpel and Schuknecht found distinct 
polarization between racial groups in New York City, citing that the growing minority 
population has increased support for the Democrats, but the decreasing white population has 
resulted in less support for the Democrats amongst white voters since the New Deal (Gimpel & 
Schuknecht, 2004).  The same trend can be seen nationally as well.  In a recent study, Norrander 
& Manzano (2010) analyzed the effects of minority group voting on the partisanship and 
ideology of all fifty states.  They found that “minority groups move state ideology in the liberal 
direction and state partisanship in the Democratic direction… white citizens move the voting 
electorate significantly in conservative and Republican directions” (Norrander & Manzano, 
2010,465).  In sum, “minority voters, even though a small proportion of many state electorates, 
affect overall state ideology and partisanship… This is an important substantive finding given 
the increasing non-white share of the electorate across the states” (Norrander & Manzano, 2010, 
467). 
 
 Since the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, minorities have become increasingly 
influential in American politics.  By passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, President Johnson and 
the Democrats were recognized as proponents of African-American rights (Carmines & Stimson, 
1989, 43).  As African-Americans became more actively involved in politics, the two parties 
recognized the significance of minority voting during elections.  The Democrats put forth great 
effort to mobilize African-American voters, and as a result they were able to garner 
overwhelming support among the minority population.  In New York, the majority of minorities 
have settled within the boroughs of New York City, which has strengthened Democratic control 
of the City.  However, minority groups have begun to leave the urban boroughs and move to the 
suburban areas of New York.  This has resulted in significant political changes in the counties 
just outside of New York City: 
 “Aging suburbs that were once the destination for white family-age migrants found 
 themselves undergoing a kind of population succession fueled by local migration that 
 benefited Democrats in the decades that closed the century.  Minorities, including African 
 Americans, Latinos, and Asians, moved to the suburbs in unprecedented numbers.  
 Inasmuch as the neighborhoods into which they move are often racially and ethnically 
 segregated, they do not face the same local political pressure to convert to GOP politics 
 that the earlier Anglo migrants faced when they had moved out from Queens and 
 Brooklyn thirty years earlier.  The established Republican regulars have not always 
 welcomed the newer immigrant and minority populations, and these feelings of exclusion 
 have been the foundation for Democratic party renewal in Nassau County” (Gimpel &
 Schuknecht, 2004, 333-4). 
 Moreover, the Republicans have made little to no effort to mobilize minority voters.  
During the Civil Rights Movement the Republicans nominated Barry Goldwater for president in 
1964, which resulted in an image of the GOP as the anti-civil rights party.  Consequently, the 
Republican Party turned its back on the black electorate (Carmines & Stimson, 1989, 47) and the 
negative impression it made has endured up until the present day.  In fact, the GOP has been 
accused of making efforts to deliberately disenfranchise minority groups, such as supporting 
proposals for stricter voter registration requirements, which make it more difficult and less likely 
that these groups will vote.   
 Felon disenfranchisement has been a recent issue in New York with some considerable 
political consequences.  While it is completely legal to deny convicted felons of the right to vote, 
New York’s Constitution specifically states that felons must not be considered as residents of the 
prisons where they are incarcerated.  Although the U.S. Census counts prisoners as residents of 
the counties where they are held, New York legislators should account for them based on where 
they resided before being imprisoned, especially when considering redistricting proposals for the 
Senate and Assembly (Wagner, 2002).  In reality, New York legislators are not adhering to these 
requirements because they have increased the sizes of rural districts upstate by counting urban 
prisoners from New York City as residents of these counties.  Furthermore, New York’s State 
Senate has been dominated by the Republicans for decades, and some of the strongest 
proponents for redistricting have been Republican Senators (Wagner, 2002). 
 Felon disenfranchisement has been particularly disadvantageous to minority groups 
because “the majority of New York's prisoners are urban and non-white, but the majority of New 
York's 70 prisons are in predominately white rural areas. In essence, these rural whites will be 
able to ‘speak for’ the incarcerated urban prisoners in ways counter to their interests” (Wagner, 
2002).  The consequences of felon disenfranchisement have not gone unnoticed, especially 
among minority groups.  Pinaire, Heumann and Bilotta (2002) conducted a study in which they 
examined public opinion on felon disenfranchisement, particularly the differences in opinion 
between races and party affiliation.  They found that African Americans were significantly more 
opposed to felon disenfranchisement than whites or Hispanics, and that there is “evidence that 
the racist origins and intentions of many of these disenfranchisement laws have translated into 
direct and disproportionate impact in terms of subgroups’ attitudes” (Pinaire, Heumann & 
Bilotta, 2002, 1546).  Moreover, it was also clear that Republicans were more likely than 
Democrats to support felon disenfranchisement (Pinaire, Heumann & Bilotta, 2002).   
 Given the fact that minorities are more likely to vote Democratic than Republican and 
Republican support for felon disenfranchisement in New York could be leading to resentment 
towards the party from minorities, it is reasonable to believe that minorities are largely 
responsible for increased support for the Democrats.  In addition, the fact that minorities are 
dispersing to other regions of the state may be causing former Republican strongholds to become 
more competitive.  Hence I also focus on the affects of increased or decreased populations of a 
particular race on party support.  In particular, I predict that areas that have experienced an 
increase in minority populations have also experienced an increase in support for the Democratic 
Party, because the Democrats have historically been more welcoming towards minorities 
compared to the Republicans.   
 
Hypothesis 1:  
 Hypothesis 1a. Regions of New York that have gained migrants from other states have 
undergone significant changes in party support.  
 Hypothesis 1b. Increased immigrant populations in counties have resulted in more 
Democratic voting. 
Hypothesis 2: Economic decline will result in more support for the Republican Party, and 
economic prosperity will lead to more Democratic voting. 
Hypothesis 3: Greater populations of young voters within counties will result in increased 
Republican voting. 
Hypothesis 4: Areas in New York that have experienced an increase in minority populations 
have also experienced an increase in support for the Democratic Party. 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS 
 In order to test my hypotheses, I collected demographic and voting data for all of the 
counties in New York spanning from 1988 to 2010.  I focused specifically on factors including 
race and ages of county populations, as well as the average median income for a given county.  I 
also looked at migration and immigration trends for each county.  For voting data I collected 
both presidential and gubernatorial election results from 1988 to 2008.  I then calculated the 
change in the Republican vote from 1988 to 2008 to see which counties became more or less 
Republican.  I then tested the change in the Republican vote against each variable to see which 
factors have had the most significant effect on the changes in party support. 
 To test my first hypothesis regarding the effects of interstate migration on party support 
within counties, I calculated the percent of the population that had moved to each county from a 
different state.  Given that there was limited Census data available for migration trends during 
the 1990s on the county level, I restricted my analysis of interstate migration to the period 
between 2005 and 2009.  I found that the number of out of state migrants is uncorrelated with the 
change in the Republican share of the vote.  However, given that Gimpel and Schuknecht had 
mentioned that migrants from specific areas of the country may have had an influence on 
partisanship in New York, I decided to assign out of state migrants to subgroups according to 
their region of origin.  I created groups for the Northeast, Midwest, South and West to see if 
there were any particular regions whose migrants may have contributed to changes in party 
support.   
 For hypothesis two I gathered the average median income for each county for 1989 and 
2009 and calculated the difference.  I then tested it against the change in the Republican vote 
from 1988 to 2008 to see if economic changes have had a significant effect on changes in party 
support.  To test my third hypothesis regarding the effects of high concentrations of young 
people on party support, I obtained the population by age for each county for 1990 and 2000.  I 
considered people between the ages of 25 and 44 as the young population, and those that were 65 
and older as the elderly population.  I calculated the change in the percent of each county’s 
population that was made up of young people from 1990 to 2000.  I then tested it against the 
change in the Republican vote between 1988 and 2008 to see if there was any correlation 
between age and party support. 
 To test my fourth and final hypothesis, I determined what percent of each county’s 
population was made up of African Americans and Hispanic/Latinos in 1990 and 2010.  I then 
combined the percentages to get a total minority population for each county.  I tested the change 
in the minority population to see if it was correlated with changes in party support in New York.  
Furthermore, knowing that the Hispanic/Latino population has been the fastest growing minority 
group in New York and the nation as a whole, I wanted to determine the extent to which the 
Hispanic/Latino population alone has influenced shifts in party support.  I predicted that the 
Hispanic/Latino population is largely responsible for the decline in Republican voting.  
Therefore, I calculated the change in the Hispanic/Latino population from 1990 to 2010 and 
tested it against the change in the Republican vote from 1988 to 2008.   
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 Using the change in the Republican vote from 1988 to 2008, I found that the counties that 
became more Republican were Montgomery, Schoharie, Genesee, Herkimer, and Niagara.  
However, since the presidential elections of the 1920s and 1930s (with the exception of Genesee 
and Schoharie) these counties have shown stronger support for the Democrats.  It is interesting to 
see that within the last few decades these counties are beginning to shift support for the 
Republican Party after maintaining support for the Democrats for most of the 20th century.   
 In turn, the counties that became much more Democratic included Warren, Clinton, 
Westchester, Essex, and Ulster.  These counties have traditionally demonstrated support for the 
Democrats, and it appears that they have only strengthened their loyalty to the Democratic Party 
in recent decades.  However, Westchester County has long been one of the suburban strongholds 
for the Republicans, and so it is significant that it has become much more Democratic since the 
1980s.  Although the counties mentioned have experienced the most substantial increases in 
support for either party, it is also important to look at the counties that have become more 
competitive during the last few presidential elections.  Suburban counties outside of New York 
City such as Suffolk and Nassau that were once highly supportive of the Republicans have begun 
to show more support for the Democrats.  This is significant because: 
  “for fifty years, Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties had drawn white residents 
 out from the boroughs with the promise of lower crime, less traffic, ethnically 
 homogenous neighborhoods, and better schools…By the late 1990s and 2000s, though, 
 the flight to Nassau County was sustained not by whites but by minorities looking for 
 their way out of Brooklyn and Queens.  North of the City, Westchester’s new populations 
 included minorities who had migrated from The Bronx.  These voters exported their 
 Democratic party affiliation to the suburbs but were less inclined to switch parties than 
 earlier arrivals had been, leading to a resurgence of Democratic strength in once one-
 party Republican towns” (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 325). 
 At the same time, a number of regions that comprised Republican territory in upstate 
New York became more Democratic.  These results confirm Gimpel and Schuknecht’s research 
on New York’s changing politics.  They found that “many parts of upstate New York have 
become more Democratic, particularly in central New York…the greater Albany area has 
become more Republican with the growth of that city’s suburbs.  Overall trends indicate that the 
counties upstate have become more competitive in presidential elections than they were at mid-
century” (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 327).  
 In regards to the effects of out of state migrants moving to New York from specific 
regions of the country, I found that a gain in migrants from the Midwest is uncorrelated with 
changes in party support.  Although counties that received a substantial amount of migrants from 
the West became somewhat more Republican, the correlation is just short of meeting standard 
levels of statistical significance.  On the other hand, counties that gained a significant amount of 
migrants from the Northeast became more Democratic, and those that received migrants from the 
South became more Republican.  Given that the Northeast is recognized as being very supportive 
of the Democrats and the majority of the South is Republican, these findings support the notion 
that migrants will maintain their partisan loyalties when moving from politically homogenous 
regions to unfamiliar locations, rather than conform to the native majority (Baldassare, 1992; 
Frey, 1985; Frey & Kobrin, 1982, Cho, Gimpel & Hui, 2010). 
 
Table 1. Correlation between the Change in the Republican Vote Share and Out of State 
Migration by Region 
 
Region   Presidential            Gubernatorial  
 Correlation  Standard Deviation Correlation  Standard Deviation 
Northeast  -0.4254 *          0.0006    -0.0642 0.6199 
Midwest  0.0076          0.9535    -0.0023 0.9859 
South  0.3235 *          0.0103     0.0088 0.9457 
West  0.2093          0.1026     0.1020 0.4303 
 
* p<.05 
 
 After analyzing the relationship between average median income and the change in the 
Republican vote, my hypothesis held true that as the economy declines, Republican voting 
increases.  Conversely, if a county’s economy improves then Republican voting declines.  For 
instance, counties that became much more Democratic, such as Westchester, Orange and Ulster 
County, also experienced significant increases in average median incomes compared to other 
regions within New York.  Moreover, counties that did not see much of an increase in average 
median incomes between 1989 and 2009, such as Montgomery and Niagara County, have 
become much more Republican due to their struggling economies. 
 
Table .2 Correlation between the Change in the Republican Vote Share and Average 
Median Income Change by County 
 
 Presidential  Gubernatorial  
 Correlation       Standard Deviation Correlation       Standard Deviation 
Change in the average median  
income between 1989 and 2009  
   -0.3139 *          0.0130 
 
0.0037                   0.9774 
*p<.05 
 
 After testing my third hypothesis to determine if increased populations have had a 
significant influence of the changes in party support, the results showed that there is some 
evidence that more young people in a given county leads to more Republican voting.  For 
example, Schoharie County was one of the regions that became significantly more Republican 
between 1988 and 2008, and its population is also made up of a significant amount of young 
voters.  It should also be noted that Schoharie is located in the more southern part of New York 
where the economy is more prosperous.  Furthermore, Schoharie is also part of the greater 
Albany area that Gimpel and Schuknecht had noted as becoming more Republican due to the 
growth of Albany’s suburbs (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 327).  With all points considered, 
Schoharie is a clear example of a region in New York that has become more appealing to young 
voters and thus more Republican due to its economic prosperity and proximity to cities that 
provide countless opportunities for employment. 
Table .3 Correlation between the Change in the Republican Vote Share and Age and the 
Effects on Party Support 
 
 Presidential  Gubernatorial  
 Correlation       Standard Deviation Correlation       Standard Deviation 
Change in the young population  
between 1990 and 2000  
   0.3975 *             0.0014       -0.0536             0.6793 
 
* p<.05 
 Lastly, after testing the change in the minority population against the change in the 
Republican vote I found that as the percent of the minority population for a given county 
increases, the percent of the total population voting Republican declines.  In some counties, 
specifically Westchester and Orange Counties, there was a particularly drastic decline in 
Republican voting coupled with a massive influx of minorities.  I then tested the Hispanic/Latino 
population alone to see if they were largely responsible for the major changes in party support in 
certain regions of New York.  The results proved that the Hispanic/Latino population is in fact 
the driving force behind drastically declining support for the Republicans, especially in counties 
where there has been a considerable increase in the Hispanic/Latino population. 
 
Table .4 Correlation between the Change in the Republican Vote Share and the Changes in 
the Minority Population by County 
 
 Presidential  Gubernatorial  
 Correlation       Standard Deviation Correlation         Standard Deviation 
Change in minority populations  
between 1990 and 2010  
   -0.2548 *         0.0456    0.0928                0.4729 
*p<.05 
 
 I then tested the Hispanic/Latino population alone to see if they were largely responsible 
for the major changes in party support in certain regions of New York.  The results proved that 
the Hispanic/Latino population is in fact the driving force behind drastically declining support 
for the Republicans, especially in counties where there has been a considerable increase in the 
Hispanic/Latino population. 
 
Table .5 Correlation between the Change in the Republican Vote Share and the Changes in 
the Hispanic/Latino Population Alone by County 
 
 Presidential  Gubernatorial  
 Correlation       Standard Deviation Correlation         Standard Deviation 
Change in the Hispanic/Latino 
population between 1990 and 
2010  
 
   -0.3740 *         0.0028    0.0702               0.5879 
*p<.05 
 
 It should be noted that all of the significant correlations were found when the variables 
were tested against the change in the Republican vote for the presidential elections; none of the 
gubernatorial election tests were statistically significant.  There are a number of reasons as to 
why this may have occurred.  First and foremost, New York gubernatorial elections take place 
during “off-years,” meaning they do not occur during the same years as presidential elections.  
Consequently, people are less likely to vote during gubernatorial elections because the cost of 
voting is much higher during off-year elections.  The cost of voting can be determined by a 
formula known as the calculus of voting, which is illustrated as follows: 
y = a + x1 – x2 – x3 – x4 
 In this formula, y represents the likelihood of voting, a represents the initial likelihood of 
voting, and x1, x2, x3, and x4 represent psychological benefits, time costs, monetary costs, and 
information costs, respectively (Pearson-Merkowitz, 2011, February 4th ).  For presidential 
elections, the political parties go to great lengths to keep voters informed on their party platforms 
regarding national issues.  It is very easy for average voters to identify with a presidential 
candidate solely based on which party they represent.  If gubernatorial elections take place 
during presidential election years, than it is relatively easy for voters to participate in elections 
because they are up to date with current party positions on key issues.  
  However, for gubernatorial elections during off-years when current political issues are 
not being debated nationally, it is much more difficult for voters to keep up with current party 
platforms.  Moreover, candidates for office on the state-level may be markedly different than the 
majority of their party in their positions on certain issues, and so more time and effort is required 
for voters to become familiar with each candidate.  In the case of New York, the increasing 
populations from out of state and abroad may find it particularly difficult to participate in 
gubernatorial elections during off-years because they cannot rely on national party platforms.  As 
a result, they must spend a significant amount of time becoming acquainted with gubernatorial 
candidates’ positions because they are unfamiliar with New York politics.  In sum, the overall 
cost of voting during off-year gubernatorial elections for New Yorkers is high, making it less 
likely that voters will participate.  Thus the changes in the Republican vote for gubernatorial 
elections in New York from 1988 to 2008 may not be significant because less people are voting 
compared to presidential elections, making the data unrepresentative of the general population. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Although the state of New York remains divided by region in terms of party support, 
there have been some significant changes that have altered century-old partisan ties in certain 
regions.  More specifically, economic and demographic changes, such as increased populations 
of young voters, minorities and immigrants that have occurred within New York over the last 
couple of decades have had a considerable impact on New York politics.  Although some regions 
have become more Republican, New York continues to be a state dominated by the Democrats as 
they have been gaining considerable ground in formally Republican territories.  The immigrant 
and minority populations in particular have been largely responsible for the changes in party 
support. These diverse groups have increased Democratic power by migrating to more suburban 
areas of New York rather than staying within the confines of the City where they have 
historically settled.  The results of this study support the findings of Gimpel and Schuknecht, 
who concluded that: 
 “The increasing proportion of minority voters moving to New York City and their rising 
 level of political involvement had the impact of solidifying Democratic domination in 
 gubernatorial and presidential elections across the four large boroughs.  Racial 
 balkanization has led to political balkanization.  With the browning of their populations, 
 the Long Island and Westchester suburbs are not as politically distinct from New York 
 City as they once were.  As the suburbs become more productive of Democratic victories, 
 New York may be headed for a purer sectionalism dividing upstate from downstate 
 because the suburban counties will come to resemble New York City more closely.  The 
 challenge for Republicans in presidential contests is that they face the loss of the New 
 York City suburbs without the prospect of making up much new ground upstate or in 
 New York City” (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 341). 
 Indeed, if the Republicans wish to gain more power in New York, they must focus on 
mobilizing the minority and immigrant electorate rather than ignoring them as they have in the 
past.  Although the current state of the economy may be beneficial to the Republicans, it is only a 
temporary condition that will change in time.  For example, Republican Bob Turner was able to 
win over the heavily Democratic 9th district because the majority of voters were dissatisfied with 
the way President Obama has been handling the economy and they wanted to see a change.  
According to an article in ‘The New York Times,” “the Turner campaign had eagerly courted 
disenchanted Democrats, and outside polling places around the district on Tuesday, multiple 
longtime Democrats confessed that despite concern about Mr. Turner’s eagerness to slash federal 
spending, they chose him hoping that his election would get lawmakers’ attention” (Kaplan, 
2011). 
 As Gimpel and Schuknecht pointed out, “in presidential elections, then, New York looks 
like an increasingly dim prospect for GOP candidates, except in the most lopsided elections 
when the Democrat has proven to be an exceptionally poor contender well before the Empire 
State voters stream to the polls,” (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, 341) much like Obama’s 
performance in office has not satisfied New York voters.  Thus it appears that Republican control 
over the Democratic 9th district may not be long-term, especially if the economy begins to 
recover.  After all, as the results of this study have shown, people tend to vote more Democratic 
as the economy improves.  Therefore it seems as though the Republican Party in its current 
position will only be able to gain significant support in New York under unique circumstances.  
However, if the GOP wants to increase their chances of gaining support in New York, they must 
pay close attention to the long-term changes in New York’s demographics and the political 
implications of increased populations of minorities and immigrants throughout the state. 
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